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Spillover Effects and Supranational Parliaments: The Case of 
Mercosur 
Andrés Malamud* and Clarissa Dri
† 
Institute of Social Sciences, University of Lisbon; Federal University of Santa Catarina, 
Florianó polis 
‘Spillover’ refers to the inner dynamics whereby the members of a regional scheme feel 
compelled to either enlarging the scope or increasing the level of their mutual 
commitments or both. It is promoted by actions crystallized into institutions, whose 
performance creates demand for further action and incremental institution-building. In 
the case of the EU, the institutions commonly acknowledged as greatest ‘spillover 
promoters’ are the Commission, the Court, and the European Parliament; in Mercosur 
there are no functional equivalents to the two former institutions yet, but a common 
Parliament (Parlasur) has been established and is often purported as a potential engine 
of integration. This paper addresses its structure and performance in order to assess 
whether it has produced, or may produce, some kind of spillover by either fostering 
new regional dynamics or cajoling national governments into upgrading their 
commitments to the region. 
Keywords: Mercosur; supranational parliaments; neofunctionalism; spillover; 
epistemic communities 
Mercosur was launched in 1991 by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay, and its 
founding treaty foresaw the establishment of a common market by the end of 1994. Its 
operation was planned to be exclusively intergovernmental so no supranational 
institutions were created, though a Joint Parliamentary Commission (JPC) with no 
competences was mentioned in passing in the last article. Several treaties and fifteen years 
later, a Parliament (Parlasur) was set up in 2006; in contrast, the main objective of 
implementing a common market has not been accomplished to date – and looks 
increasingly implausible. This reversal of priorities is puzzling, as substantive goals are 
deferred again and again while procedural institutions multiply themselves without 
consequential results. There is, however, a further particularity that bewilders comparative 
analysts: unlike the European Union (EU), there are no functional equivalents in Mercosur 
to the Commission or the Court of Justice.1 Thus, the Parliament stands as the top 
community institution and the most likely to further integration from within. 
The expectation that a regional parliament may become an engine for further 
integration, as well as a powerful ruling institution in itself, is rooted in the EU experience: 
For much of the half-century since its humble beginnings, the European Parliament [ . . . ] was 
was marginal to the development of European integration and the politics of the European 
Union. Initially, the institution was essentially a consultative body composed of delegates of 
national parliaments. Fifty years on, the elected Parliament has significant legislative and 
executive investiture/removal powers and all the trappings of a democratic parliament that 
flow from such powers: powerful party organizations, highly-organized committees, a 
supporting bureaucracy and constant lobbying from private interest groups.2 
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By drawing on the neofunctionalist concept of spillover and its derivatives, we provide 
a framework to gauge the potential of Parlasur for the further development of 
Mercosur, to explain – more generally – institutional proliferation in the face of policy 
deadlock, and to analyse what this means for both Mercosur prospects and integration 
theory. 
The article proceeds in three steps. First, it introduces the species of which 
Parlasur is an instance, i.e. so-called supranational parliaments, and the theoretical 
framework to which the concept and family of spillover are central. Second, it presents 
an analytical account of Parlasur’s creation and evolution supported by a series of 
interviews conducted by one of the authors in Brasilia, Buenos Aires and Montevideo 
during 2009. Third, it evaluates these developments in light of the established 
framework to check which member of the spillover family has taken place – or is likely 
to take place. Will it ever be possible to speak of Parlasur as the European Parliament is 
referred to in the above paragraph? The conclusion summarizes our findings and 
projections. 
Supranational Parliaments and the Spillover Family 
A parliament lato sensu is an assembly that performs four functions within a political 
system: popular representation, law-making, control of the executive, and training of 
political leaders. Stricto sensu, parliaments differ from legislatures in that, while entitled 
with the extra function of nominating the executive, they usually lack significant 
independent legislative authority.3 Both parliaments and legislatures are usually located at 
the nation-state level, but they are also found below and above it. In such cases, they are 
called subnational and supranational (or international), respectively. 
Several regional organizations, mainly in Europe, Africa and Latin America, have 
established parliamentary assemblies. In December 2009, membership of the Inter-
Parliamentary Union (IPU) accounted for 152 national members and eight associate 
members, all of the latter having an international nature: the Andean Parliament, the 
Central American Parliament, the East African Legislative Assembly, the European 
Parliament, the Inter-Parliamentary Committee of the West African Economic and 
Monetary Union, the Latin American Parliament, the Parliament of the Economic 
Community of West African States, and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe. To these, the recently upgraded Parliament of Mercosur and the Pan-African 
Parliament can be added (Table 1). 
The history, structure and competencies of these assemblies vary widely, as does the 
degree of legitimacy they enjoy. Of all of them, only the European Parliament (EP) has 
developed a truly supranational character and been allowed to hold effective power. Three 
factors contributed to the EP’s evolution from simply another international parliamentary 
assembly into a unique supranational parliament with real decisional powers and a central 
role in the process of European integration: early supranationalism, extraordinary 
leadership and, later, direct election.4 Although the differences between the EP and the rest 
are remarkable, this does not necessarily mean that the latter have been irrelevant but 
rather that the functions they perform may not be sufficient yet to qualify them strictly as 
parliaments. 
As far as representation is concerned, only a few international parliaments appoint 
their members through popular elections. However, in most of these cases demographic 
proportionality is fully absent. With regard to law-making and control competencies, no 












































226 Andrés Malamud and Clarissa Dri 
Table 1. Regional international parliaments 
Date of creation / upgrade Parliamentary institution Acronym 
1949 Parliamentary Assembly of the Council PACE 
of Europe 
1952/1979 European Parliament EP 
1964/1987 Latin American Parliament PARLATINO 
1979/1984 Andean Parliament PARLANDINO 
1986/1991 Central American Parliament PARLACEN 
1991/2006 Mercosur Parliament PARLASUR 
1994 Inter-Parliamentary Committee of the West IPC 
African Economic and Monetary Union 
2001 East African Legislative Assembly EALA 
2004 Pan-African Parliament PAP 
2006 ECOWAS Parliament 
Parliaments listed by date of creation. Adapted from Andrés Malamud and Stelios Stavridis, “Parliaments and 
Parliamentarians as International Actors”, in Bob Reinalda (ed.): The Ashgate Research Companion to Non-State 
Actors. Farnham, UK, Ashgate, 2011, pp. 101– 15. 
significant monitoring powers. Andrés Malamud and Luı́s de Sousa outline five factors 
that account for the difference between the EP and the rest.5 The first factor that 
distinguishes the evolution of regional parliaments is time: the process of European 
integration started between two and five decades before the Latin American and African 
processes, so differences regarding institutional development may be due to maturity gaps. 
The second factor is sequence: the current structure of the EU was set up according to the 
‘Monnet-method’, meaning that function should precede form and that incrementalism is 
preferred to early institutionalization. This fact allowed the Euro-parliamentarians 
themselves to push for further empowerment of the EP, instead of it being granted full 
powers from scratch; in other words, increasing activism brought about growing 
competences, which in turn induced further activism. By contrast, other regions have 
unsuccessfully attempted to skip phases, transplanting European outcomes but 
overlooking the process that led thereof. Third, there is a wide disparity regarding the 
level of integration. While the EU is already a common market and is consolidating into an 
economic union, very few of its African and Latin American counterparts have even 
reached the previous level: a customs union. Logically, the institutional structure needed 
for a complex organization does not necessarily fit a simpler one. Fourth, the degree of 
success in the creation of regional institutions cannot be dissociated from the effectiveness 
with which institutions work at home: weak or unstable domestic institutions are not a 
good foundation upon which to build regional institutions. Fifth, most European countries 
feature parliamentary or semi-parliamentary regimes, whereas most African and all Latin 
American countries have presidential ones. A parliament is not expected to perform the 
same role regardless of the institutional context: if, in Europe, it is conceived of as the 
institution where government is ultimately made and undone, in most of Africa and Latin 
America the election, authority and survival of the government are independent of 
parliamentary will. Furthermore, it would be unreasonable to expect that the rulers of 
presidential regimes do not replicate, on the regional level, a feature that serves them well 
on the domestic level.6 
As mentioned above, representation, legislation, and control are competencies not 
frequently conferred upon international parliaments. However, the fourth function of a 
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The growing density of international interactions, together with a sense of solidarity 
stemming from belonging to a common body, may contribute to reshaping identities, 
diffusing practices and promoting social learning.7 They also may help accomplish 
complementary goals such as nurturing a common regional identity among political elites 
and strengthening the symbolic presence of the regional organization in the minds of the 
public and third countries. This could eventually produce unexpected consequences, for 
which integration studies have coined an apposite label: spillover. 
What is Spillover and What to Expect from It 
Neo-functionalism is a theory or approach first developed by Ernst Haas around the 1960s 
to account for processes of transnational integration.8 It drew on functionalism, an earlier 
approach advocated by David Mitrany whose main pitfalls were the neglect of political 
and geographical factors.9 Although its most sophisticated version was employed to 
understand the International Labor Organization,10 it became best known because of its 
application to the European Community.11 The neo-functionalist approach argued that 
‘what matters most is a utilitarian calculus on the part of actors, and not a dramatic or 
passionate commitment to a new order’.12 The theory conceived of integration as an open 
process, characterized by the spillover from one area to another. In any case, it was ‘clearly 
intended to be institutional’.13 
Spillover, the central metaphor of neo-functionalist theory, is the process whereby ‘a 
given action, related to a specific goal, creates a situation in which the original goal can be 
assured only by taking further actions, which in turn create a further condition and a need 
for more, and so forth’.14 The notion is that integration in one sector will create incentives 
for integration in other sectors and further delegation of authority in the same sector. 
Although neo-functionalism was sensitive to the difference between background, initial 
and process conditions, it ‘had more to say about the ongoing role of institutions than 
about the factors that explain the birth of regionalist schemes’15: its main accent and 
stronger predictions were focused on the process. Once integration had started, neo­
functionalism saw it being fostered by two sorts of spillover: functional and political, as in 
their view, politicization was initially avoidable but later inescapable. This mechanism 
predicted that integration would become self-sustaining, as the emerging conflicts of 
interest would be dealt with by enlarging the tasks and expanding the authority of the 
common institutions. Indeed, European integration has been driven as much by 
intergovernmental treaties as by unforeseen, interstitial change, that is, structural 
transformations brought about by the daily operation of EU institutions, rather than by the 
strategic calculations of national executives.16 In particular, the role played by the Court of 
Justice has been crucial to foster integration, even – or above all – during the seeming 
stagnation ages of the 1970s and early 1980s.17 It did so by establishing the direct effect of 
community law and its supremacy over national legislation between 1963 and 1964, and 
by banning unilateral restrictions on trade through the establishment of the principle of 
mutual recognition in 1979. 
Philippe Schmitter conceived of spillover as a member of a more numerous family (see 
Table 2).18 Given two defining variables, scope (coverage of issue areas) and level 
(decisional capacity) of authority, spillover meant the simultaneous increment in both 
indicators. In contrast, simultaneous decline was called spillback. Greater decisional 
authority along with less coverage of issue areas was labeled retrench, whereas muddle 
about named the opposite case. Two extra possibilities were also anticipated: spillaround, 












































228 Andrés Malamud and Clarissa Dri 
Table 2. Spillover Family 
SCOPE OF AUTHORITY 
þ ¼ 2 








2 Muddle about Spillback Spillback 
Own elaboration based on Philippe C. Schmitter (1970), “Central American Integration: Spill-Over, Spill-Around 
or Encapsulation?” Journal of Common Market Studies, 9 (1), 1970, pp. 1–48. 
authority; and buildup, which implied greater levels of authority irrespective of any 
increment regarding its scope. In this view, only spillover and buildup led to the 
construction of a political community. Finally, encapsulation meant the maintenance of 
the status quo. 
Over time, however, spillover did not take place as expected. What first appeared as a 
complex and mechanical process changed afterwards into an extremely contingent 
phenomenon, of little use for understanding general events. De Gaulle’s unforeseen 
challenge to the deepening of European integration was decisive for Haas’s theoretical 
reformulation: henceforth, the role that individuals could play, especially when embedded 
in powerful institutions, could not be inferred from the dynamics of integration.19 The 
change of focus, from a rather automatic and incremental evolution of international 
complexity toward a less-determined process, led to the modification of previous 
assumptions. Haas began to stress the role of ideas and ‘consensual knowledge’, paying 
increasing attention to the relevance of political leaders and their goals.20 Hence the 
potential of regional institutions: within them, national politicians can be socialized in an 
international environment that fosters common understandings and the emergence of a 
regional awareness. 
The Development and Structure of Parlasur 
Parlasur does not fit well into the category of supranational parliaments, but it is already 
more than a pure international assembly. According to its founding treaty, Members of the 
Mercosur Parliament (MPs) shall be elected by universal suffrage and, from 2015 
onwards, the elections are to be held on the same day in all member states. Furthermore, 
the number of seats for each country will be adjusted by population, and MPs may 
organize themselves in political groups according to ideological affinity rather than 
nationality. 
The institutional design resulted from the convergence of a wide range of interests. 
Among the most remarkable were the will of a handful of technocrats and experts 
responsible for the elaboration of the Constitutive Protocol, who expected the Parliament 
to overcome its initial powerlessness through the exploitation of inchoate competences. 
Some civil society groups foresaw the Parliament as a means of getting information on the 
integration process and garnering support for their demands. Also, economic actors who 
had difficult access to national ministries hoped to lobby their interests through their MPs. 
In contrast, other groups expected Parlasur to keep its decisional weakness and acted 
accordingly: professional diplomats of all Mercosur states and parliamentarians with 
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In accordance with Jean Grugel’s findings on Mercosur at large, no grassroots social 
movements were involved in the creation of Parlasur.21 Instead, the process was led by a 
few national lawmakers, policy experts and officials from member states and international 
organizations, among which was the EU. In spite of the democratic deficit denounced by 
several local scholars,22 organized interests preferred to influence governments through 
diplomacy while radical groups opted for more confrontational tactics and mobilization 
rather than investing on a parliamentary channel. 
Parlasur’s blueprints date back to the first parliamentary meetings of the bloc in 
1991.23 Its establishment was listed as a goal of its predecessor, the JPC, in the two 
editions (1991 and 1997) of its Rules of Procedure. It reflects a trajectory marked by the 
principles of gradualism, flexibility and equilibrium as stated in the Mercosur founding 
treaty, but it is also a consequence of broader demands for institutional reform fostered 
by the 2002 economic crisis.24 By then, new administrations had taken over in Argentina 
and Brazil, opening a policy window for structural changes in Mercosur.25 The creation 
of a parliament had been discussed for years as a solution to the alleged lack of 
transparency and democratic deficit of the bloc; under the new circumstances, the project 
found fertile soil in which  to  grow.  The  way had  been  paved in  1997  with the  
establishment of the Permanent Administrative Parliamentary Secretariat of Mercosur 
after the European Commission demanded an interlocutor with whom to negotiate.26 
This agency changed the dynamics and organizational patterns of the JPC: in spite of 
its reduced staff, the Secretariat centralized the administrative structure in Montevideo 
and provided technical support. In 1999, it produced the first agenda for the 
institutionalization of a permanent parliament. Meetings and seminars organized under 
its umbrella brought together national parliamentarians, technocrats and academics, who 
provided theoretical and political bases for the two first proposals, which were presented 
in 2003 by the Argentine and Brazilian delegations. Meanwhile, the new presidents of 
both countries expressed their will of consolidating Mercosur as a political project.27 
This trend gained momentum in 2004, after the victory of the Frente Amplio in the 
Uruguayan elections. The Common Market Council (CMC) decision 49/2004,28 which 
authorized the JPC to take all necessary steps for the establishment of the parliament by 
December 2006, was crucial.29 The JPC managed to complete this duty in time, against 
Mercosur authorities’ predictions.30 
Parlasur’s Constitutive Protocol was approved by the CMC in December 2005, and 
during 2006 it was ratified by all member states. The procedure was not easy: besides 
convincing congress leaders to include the issue on the agenda, JPC members had to 
instruct their national colleagues about the very integration process, with which most 
lawmakers were not familiar. In the case of Argentina, one deputy alone had conducted 
most of the negotiations. As a consequence, a Uruguayan senator had to travel to Buenos 
Aires to explain to the Argentine senators what the regional parliament was about. In 
Brazil, after months of negotiations, the president of the JPC national delegation carried 
the bill himself from one chamber to the other, enabling its approval in both houses in the 
same afternoon. Parlasur was officially inaugurated in Brasilia in December 2006, and its 
first sitting took place in Montevideo in May 2007. 
The Protocol established a simple institutional structure, allegedly to be refined once 
the Parliament was installed. Parlasur was founded as a unicameral chamber that 
represents the peoples of Mercosur. During the first transitional period (2007 – 2010), each 
national congress was to nominate eighteen members. From the second transitional period 
on (2011 – 2014), Parlasur should be composed of national representatives elected by 












































230 Andrés Malamud and Clarissa Dri 
was eventually approved by the end of 2010 and came into force one year later.31 Yet, only 
the Paraguayan MPs have been directly elected to date. Their mandate lasts for four years 
and consecutive re-election is allowed. 
The Bureau is the leading organ, responsible for the agenda and administrative 
matters. It is composed of one representative from each member state with a two-year 
mandate and alternation of the presidency every six months. The Parliament is set to meet 
once a month from February to December, and these meetings should be open to the 
public. Its decisions are made through different majorities, thus replacing the previous 
unanimity method. The budget of about a million and a half dollars depends on equal 
contributions from member states,32 although it is expected to become proportional to 
their gross domestic product once proportional representation is implemented.33 
Parliamentary work is assisted by four secretaries – Administrative, Parliamentary, 
International Relations and Communication. These correspond to a deep-seated Mercosur 
tradition: each country nominates one chief. Technical and administrative staff are to be 
appointed through public competition, but until now the approximately thirty-five officials 
have been selected by national parliamentarians or parties. As to headquarters, Parlasur’s 
future is still undecided: for the time being, its infrastructure is limited to six small rooms 
in the Mercosur Secretariat building. Parliamentarians organize themselves in ten 
permanent committees, and composition is determined annually by the Bureau. 
Temporary and special committees can also be formed, as well as external delegations 
created to represent the assembly in international agencies and events. Four temporary 
committees have been organized to date to investigate transnational problems regarding 
sanitary matters and human rights. According to the Rules of Procedure, the integration of 
the committees should be proportional to the size of the political groups, but the national 
criterion has prevailed. Committees meet once a month before the plenary session, but the 
lack of specialized staff has made their activities dependent on the president’s availability. 
Parlasur’s functions are extremely modest in comparison to national parliaments: it 
lacks real competences of legislation and control, and the activities it performs do not have 
binding effects on either authorities or citizens (Table 3). Nevertheless, in comparison to 
other regional parliaments and to the former JPC, its attributions reveal some potential. If 
exploited, they may help the Parliamentarians to collect information, build links with 
citizen and social actors, and put political pressure on national executives. Parlasur has 
been increasing its working rate: more than 170 normative acts were adopted since 2007, 
from an average of 1.5 acts per plenary session in 2007 to 7.5 in 2009. A report on human 
rights was published in 2009, and seminars have been organized more often since 2008. 
However, these activities are not the most likely to influence the Mercosur decision-
making process. Resolutions and declarations still correspond to more than 70% of the acts 
approved by the Parliament, whereas no opinions have ever been asked or delivered, and 
only five bills were proposed to the CMC since 2006.34 
Towards Institutional Consolidation? 
Since its first sitting in 2007, the Parliament has held discussions on subjects of regional or 
international interest such as the financial crisis, human rights, the Paraguayan demands on 
Itaipu, and Venezuela’s accession to Mercosur. But the key topics behind the scenes are 
those related to institutional consolidation. Approving the Rules of Procedure was the first 
step, taken in the third plenary session after three months of negotiations. The 
disagreements that emerged during this process have pervaded parliamentary discussions 
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Table 3. Parlasur functions 
Representation The Parliament represents the peoples of Mercosur. It can organize public 
meetings and seminars with civil society and social actors. It shall organize 
meetings with representatives from the Consultative Economic 
and Social Forum. It may issue declarations and recommendations. 
Legislation	 The Parliament can produce: 
- Opinions: formal statements about legislative projects of the CMC. 
- Legislative projects: bills presented to the CMC. 
- Legislative draft projects: bills presented to national parliaments in order 
to harmonize member states legislation. 
- Recommendations: proposals to Mercosur decisional organs. 
- Reports: studies about specific subjects. 
- Resolutions: administrative rules on its internal organization. 
- Declarations: manifestations about any subject of public interest. 
Accountability	 In order to oversee other Mercosur organs, the Parliament may: 
- Receive an annual report of the Mercosur Secretariat budget 
- Produce an annual report on the situation of human rights in the region. 
- Receive petitions related to actions or omissions of Mercosur organs. 
- Require written information, which should be answered in up to 180 days. 
- Invite representatives of other institutions to discuss the integration process. 
- Receive authorities from the Temporary Presidency at the beginning 
and end of each semester to present respectively the plan 
and evaluation of activities. 
- Demand consultative opinions to the Permanent Review Tribunal. 
Socialization - Organization in committees and interaction with technical staff 
- Organization of transnational political groups 
Own elaboration based on Parlasur’s Constitutive Protocol and Rules of Procedure. 
Protocol. They are closely interconnected and refer to political groupings, proportionality, 
rules of decision and popular elections. 
One of the most controversial matters was the conformation of political groups, but a 
solution was rapidly found. The Rules establish that groups may be composed of at least 
five parliamentarians from two or more member states. However, and against the will of 
some MPs who put ideological affinity over nationality, the Rules also envisage groups 
formed by deputies from a single member state, provided that they gather 10% of its 
representatives. The first such group was organized in 2007 and was composed exclusively 
by Uruguayan members of the Partido Nacional. But even before the installation of the 
Parliament, there was a rapprochement among parliamentarians coming from left-wing 
sectors willing to constitute a transnational group.35 After three years of meetings, the 
Progressive Group was formalized in December 2009. Right-wing forces also have held 
talks, but the organization of a transnational group that included Brazilian representatives 
was suspended after former president Fernando Henrique Cardoso manifested his will that 
the Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira (PSDB) keep its international reputation of a 
social-democratic party by not making alliances with Paraguayan and Uruguayan right­
wingers.36 
The controversy around population proportionality is perhaps the oldest regarding 
Parlasur. The Constitutive Protocol mandated the Parliament to institute a ‘citizenship 
representation rule’ by the end of 2007, but this never happened. Although the concept of 
proportional representation was included in the first drafts of the Protocol, disagreements 
among national delegations were too strong and, in order to have the document approved, 
negotiators decided to leave implementation details out. The establishment of the 












































232 Andrés Malamud and Clarissa Dri 
reticent to the idea of having bigger Argentinean and Brazilian delegations in the 
assembly. In a unilateral attempt at keeping the composition untouched, Paraguay 
organized direct elections in April 2008. One year later, the assembly approved a ‘political 
agreement’ that fixed the number of seats for each state and asked for a reinforcement of 
the judicial branch of Mercosur, a condition imposed by the Paraguayan delegation. The 
agreement established a formula of attenuated proportionality: Brazil would have 75 MPs, 
Argentina 43, Paraguay 18, Uruguay 18 and Venezuela 31 (once it becomes a full 
member). Brazil is allocated the largest delegation but can be outnumbered by any three 
other countries together. Furthermore, in the first elections Brazil and Argentina are set to 
elect a reduced number of representatives (36 and 27 respectively) in order to smooth the 
way towards greater proportionality – as well as minimize domestic criticism focused on 
growing public expenditure. The agreement also calls for the creation of a supranational 
court of justice, which is considered by Paraguay as a means of strengthening the 
integration process and protecting the country from decisions made by its larger 
neighbours. As Brazil is not willing to submit itself to a supranational authority, the 
Paraguayan move jeopardized the implementation of proportional representation. After 
more than a year on stand by, in September 2010, the four ministries of foreign affairs 
accepted an invitation of the Parliament to participate in a plenary session and formally 
approved the agreement. They ruled that its implementation would take place as from 
2011, and decided to constitute a task force to discuss a proposal for a court of justice. 
When it comes to decision-making, the Rules establish a complex system of majorities 
that is not connected to the content of a decision but to its form. The system makes it 
easier to approve the less consequential legislative instruments, i.e. declarations and 
recommendations. Once Parlasur is composed by a different number of deputies per state, 
the majority to make a decision will have to weigh not only votes, but also the number of 
nationalities they represent. In 2010, a group of deputies proposed a reform establishing 
that at least 25% of all national delegations should be present in order for a matter to be 
considered. This proposal was rejected by the Parliament, which considered it would 
obstruct parliamentary work instead of improving it.37 
Direct elections are a less controversial issue since the majority of MPs favor it, in 
accordance with the Constitutive Protocol. But difficulties remain for finding a consensus 
on proportionality.38 In Argentina, a committee of staff and deputies started meeting in 
mid-2009 to elaborate a draft proposal. Eventually, in September 2010 six bills were 
presented, four in the Chamber of Deputies and two in the Senate. In Uruguay, Parlasur has 
not yet entered the electoral agenda. In Brazil negotiations started in 2009, when a bill was 
introduced in the Chamber of Deputies. At the time, though, it did not gather sufficient 
political support to be placed in the plenary agenda. MPs who were not involved in 
regional affairs did not make big efforts in favour of the bill, so pro-integration MPs 
preferred to keep the status quo, i.e. their simultaneous condition of national and regional 
MPs in the following Brazilian legislature (2011 – 2014).39 Additionally, some members of 
the Brazilian delegation did not see the point of electing members for a regional assembly 
that would lack popular legitimacy due to the absence of proportional representation. Once 
the agreement on proportionality was reached, the bill on direct elections could be 
discussed as, for some MPs, elections should take place only in 2014. 
The above-mentioned aspects reflect the precarious structure over which Parlasur is 
being built and reveal three trends. First, substantive policy is relegated by institutional 
self-concern. Actions seeking further institutionalization of Parlasur are certainly required, 
but meager attention to other relevant issues may impair the very process and damage the 
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instead of joining forces to face national executives and intergovernmental procedures, 
most MPs replicate disagreements along national cleavages. Third, the parliamentary 
agenda was mainly determined prior to the inauguration of Parlasur and expresses the 
concerns of the actors that elaborated the Constitutive Protocol. If, on the one hand, the 
innovative features of Parlasur are an outcome of those actors’ vision, on the other they 
express the gap between the original ideals and the hard facts of South American politics. 
Explaining the Current State of Parlasur 
The recurrent postponement of the implementation of the Constitutive Protocol, and the 
toothlessness of the Parliament derived thereof, recognize two kinds of causes: structural 
and attitudinal. Structural constraints rest on demographic asymmetries, which make of 
parliamentary composition a challenging puzzle to solve. Brazil has roughly 80% of the 
population of the bloc, so any distribution that allocates to it less than 50% of seats could 
be regarded as undemocratic and thus politically unfeasible. On the other hand, giving 
Brazil more than 50% of seats would entail it to a permanent majority, thus triggering 
resistance from the other member states. A compromise would be feasible only by 
conceding either party, i.e. Brazil or the rest, the majority while simultaneously stripping it 
of any real power, either by requiring super majorities or by not endowing the parliament 
with significant competences. Whereas the former option diminishes democratic 
legitimacy and popular sovereignty, the latter annuls any decision-making capacities. 
The only way out of this dilemma would be through enlargement, which could mitigate 
current demographic asymmetries by diluting Brazil’s population share: to this end, all of 
South America should come into the Mercosur fold, an unlikely possibility for the 
foreseeable future. 
As regards attitudinal constraints, nationalism – both ideological and strategic – 
explains why most MPs have not pushed for broader institutional competences. Mercosur 
elites promote regionalism as far as it does not encroach upon national sovereignty. ‘States 
fear supranationalism. In some aspects they think it may be beneficial, but in practice they 
do not want to leave decisions to an instance that is not directly controlled by the 
governments. All Mercosur countries are a bit schizophrenic when it comes to this 
point’.40 The advantages of supranationalism are linked to the idea of integration as a tool 
to gain leverage in international negotiations: ‘if we present a unified position, or at least a 
concerted opinion, we become much stronger in any subject of the international agenda’.41 
But the time is not ripe for most Latin American states to accept the sharing of sovereignty. 
The dominance of national interests is defended at all levels of power and society, whether 
by the Executive, the Judiciary, political parties, economic actors or common citizens. It is 
no wonder that this view also prevails in the legislatures, as supporting supranationalism is 
not likely to gain votes or political opportunities. 
This scenario explains the overall harmony within national delegations in Parlasur. 
The Brazilian representation gathers deputies from opposite parties that have crucial 
disagreements in the national arena, however, in Montevideo they vote together, express 
similar views and even choose the president of the delegation by consensus. As a Brazilian 
MP stated, ‘we work there as deputies from Brazil, he is not from the PT neither me [sic] 
from the PSDB, we are just parliamentarians of Brazil and of Mercosur. Then you develop 
mutual respect and affinities; although in some aspects ideological divergences remain, 
they are overcome by a greater interest’.42 The Argentine representation has also displayed 
a high degree of homogeneity in spite of internal ideological differences. The Paraguayan 
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dilute nationalism: this is the only delegation that staunchly opposed population 
proportionality. ‘There would be an unbalanced system that would not be able to respond 
accurately when you face an irregular situation of disrespecting interests or violating 
rights’,43 states a Paraguayan MP referring to the risk that proportionality represents for 
his country’s interests. The Uruguayan delegation is different from the rest: due to strong 
party traditions, positions are split between left-wing and right-wing representations. The 
latter is more nationalist whereas the former favours supranationalism, but even in this 
case domestic politics has hindered pro-integration initiatives. 
The situation within the Parliament staff is contradictory. On the one hand, each 
official acts as a ‘spy’ for her own government, so national linkages and nationalist 
behaviour are explicit. On the other hand, some of these officials were appointed by 
political parties, so they tend to be more sensitive to organizing along political lines than 
the MPs themselves. They tend to adapt to the institution and socialize faster than the MPs, 
creating linkages with officials from other countries who have the same political leaning. 
Sometimes these linkages go beyond the professional level: unlike most MPs, they live in 
Montevideo so they need to make friends there. ‘Yes, he is an official here, I have a very 
fluid relationship with him because I assist the political group [x] and he helps the 
Argentineans [within the same political group]. We meet to define the agenda of the 
political group. But we have a relationship out of here [the Secretariat] as well. There are 
others here that have a relationship out of here because of political affinities. [ . . . ] But 
because of these political affinities there are some political difficulties that spoils [sic] 
administrative and institutional work’.44 
Dominant nationalist perspectives deter spillover for two reasons. First, the existence 
of ‘monolithic national delegations’45 does not stimulate the formation of transnational, 
ideologically-oriented political groups. ‘We are very nationally-oriented. If we could not 
yet take off the Brazilian jersey and wear the Latin American one, how can we consider 
that we are close to each other in ideological terms?’46 This situation impairs open debates 
and the construction of political alternatives. Second, the defense of national interests 
approximates Legislative and Executive positions within each country, hence reinforcing 
the traditional Executive predominance and its leading role on integration matters. As a 
result, most MPs act as diplomats trying to reap benefits for their own states and national 
parties. 
Parlasur is the ultimate example of the reluctance of Mercosur national authorities to 
share sovereignty and delegate power. In spite of the rhetoric surrounding it, the 
Executives did not empower an agency that could challenge their power. The widespread 
idea that the Parliament is to be primarily ‘a bumper of international relations in South 
America’ confirms this view.47 Contributing to conflict resolution and facilitating 
negotiations through political dialogue may constitute important roles, but they cannot 
promote integration if decision-making authority is not strengthened. And, as a high 
official at the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs put it, ‘the Parliament may be 
consulted and gain influence if it shows ability to speed up the ratification of agreements in 
national chambers, but a long way is needed before national governments accept to 
relinquish decision-making competences’.48 In this official’s jargon, ‘long way’ appears as 
a subtle metaphor for ‘never’. 
Conclusion and Prospects 
Parlasur’s negligible competences and defective institutionalization have prevented it 
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a typical Mercosur pattern of proliferating consultative bodies and increasing the coverage 
of issue areas without upgrading authority. Given the control that the national executives 
have exerted over the bloc’s operation,50 expecting that a legislative branch would be 
given effective authority goes against experience. Instead, spillaround was a more likely 
outcome. And indeed the bloc has widened the number of its institutions, but it has not 
increased their authority and no supranationality has emerged. 
Six years after its foundation, and well within the second transitional period, the 
Parliament Constitutive Protocol has been systematically infringed upon and is not yet 
fully implemented – far from it. During this time, popular elections have taken place only 
in Paraguay, Parlasur has undergone no empowerment, and parliamentary oversight of the 
bloc procedures has not led to an increase in regional transparency or a rise of domestic 
incorporation rates.51 If Parlasur has had any effect, it has been limited to soft features 
such as the intensification of political socialization and the nurturing of a regional 
awareness, although this is not evident from the interviews we conducted. 
The transplantation of EU-like institutions is a common feature in Latin American 
regional organizations, as has been shown for the case of the Andean Court of Justice.52 
Epistemic communities and transnational advocacy networks are behind such moves, 
since professional groups and think tanks share cognitive maps and common interests.53 
Trained by European institutions or influenced by their lobbying and weltanschauung, 
many consultants and scholars advocate a sort of cloning of the EU structure in other 
settings. For their part, local politicians have so far seen only benefits in mimicking the 
European path, as the role model was not only successful but also willing to finance their 
institutional experiments. In the European case, as Berthold Rittberger has shown, 
political elites fostered the parliamentarization of the EU as they tried to fix the imbalance 
between procedural and consequentialist legitimacy, which had been brought about by the 
transference of sovereignty to a supranational level of governance.54 In contrast, in 
Mercosur two features stand out: first, structural conditions such as physical connectivity 
and transnational interactions are much less favorable to integration; second, and perhaps 
more important, decision-making rules are purely intergovernmental and the politicians 
that favor supranationalism are secondary or even marginal figures in their national 
political systems. 
To be sure, most of the above could change unexpectedly. The fact that some stubborn 
actors hold positive expectations of an assembly stripped of legislative capacity can prove 
consequential in the long run. The history of European integration has been pushed 
forward by international treaties as much as by unforeseen transformations that took place 
between – and often beyond – those treaties, which in time led to treaty revision and the 
upgrade of the integration scheme. The nationalist behavior of Parlasur members could be 
challenged by the progressive institutionalization of ideologically-oriented transnational 
groups, provided that MPs are popularly elected. The main locus of debate within the 
assembly could then gradually shift from national delegations to political groups. Public 
competition to staff the Parliament and full-time appointment of parliamentary assistants 
may also stimulate organizational development. Promoting decision-making transparency 
and public access to meetings and documents could further foster popular legitimacy. 
All this said, the future of Parlasur is not independent from the prospects of Mercosur 
itself. Nikoleta Yordanova argues that the organizational development of the European 
Parliament has been a response to ‘external (institutional) developments’ of the EU 
structure.55 Accordingly, Kathryn Hochstetler has shown that it is the little relevance of 
Mercosur decisions that explains the lack of interest of civil society and social movements 
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Brussels is seen as a significant power site, the perceived irrelevance of Mercosur 
discourages social participation and reduces demand for further integration. Global events 
such as the rise of China and ensuing changes in foreign policy agendas may accelerate 
Mercosur’s decay, as suggested by the proliferation of competing international 
organizations in Latin America and by the growing unilateral strategy developed by 
Brazil.57 If the 1990s saw a global revival of regionalism, the 2010s may witness a decline 
of regional integration in the name of privileged relations between traditional and 
emergent state actors. In such a scenario, the powerlessness of Parlasur would only be a 
reflection of the growing irrelevance of its institutional environment, and its potential to 
produce spillover effects may never develop. 
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Parlamento del Mercosur: un actor regional, Montevideo, Fundación Friedrich Ebert, 
2009, p. 20. 
36.	 Interview with Brazilian Congress official, Brasilia, 13 April 2009. 
37.	 For comments by Dr. Rosinha and Sérgio Zambiasi see, Anonymous, ‘Comissão decide 
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